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INTRODUCTION
In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the United States Supreme
Court dealt with a particularly pernicious form of employer retaliation.1 The case
involved the surprisingly common fact pattern in which an employer retaliates
against an employee who has complained about employment discrimination by
taking action against a different employee, usually a relative or friend.2 The
employer in this case would obviously recognize that it would be illegal to fire
the complaining employee. But if the employer was angered by the charge of
1

562 U.S. 170 (2011).
Id. at 172; see Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the
Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 934 n.10 (2007) (citing cases).
2
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discrimination and wished to deter other employees from making such charges
in the future, retaliating against the complaining employee by targeting a
coworker might be an effective, cold-blooded solution. Indeed, prior to the
Court’s decision in Thompson, the majority of courts held that Title VII did not
prohibit an employer from doing so.3 But in Thompson, the Court held that Title
VII prohibits this form of third-party retaliation.4
One might have thought that this decision would have limited the number of
instances of employer retaliation involving third parties. But the human impulse
to retaliate against those who have wronged us is strong.5 Therefore, it should
not be surprising to find that some employers have devised other ways to
retaliate against employees when third parties are somehow involved. Consider
the case of an employee who complains to her employer about workplace
discrimination. The employer responds not by firing the complaining employee
or even a coworker à la Thompson, but by taking against action a nonemployee
friend or relative—for example by pressuring the friend or relative’s employer
to fire that employee. Or perhaps an employee is fired in response to reporting
to his employer that a coworker has been sexually harassing an employee of a
different employer with whom the coworker comes into contact as a result of his
employment. Would either individual have a retaliation claim under Title VII?
As this Article discusses, neither employee has a valid Title VII retaliation
claim under the majority approaches to these situations.6 Stated succinctly, this
Article argues that these outcomes are wrong, both as a matter of law and policy.
But this Article also uses these scenarios in order to make a broader point about
the shortcomings of employment retaliation law in general and its specific
failure to adequately take into account the interests of third parties.
The primary goal of employment discrimination statutes is to end workplace
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other enumerated characteristics.7
Title VII, like most statutes regulating the workplace, also contains a provision
limiting an employer’s ability to retaliate against an employee who somehow
opposes unlawful conduct or participates in a legal action concerning such

3

See Long, supra note 2, at 934.
Thompson, 562 U.S. at 174.
5 Alex B. Long, Using the IIED Tort to Address Discrimination and Retaliation in the Workplace, 2022
U. ILL. L. REV. 1325, 1358 (2022).
6 See infra notes 67–85, 102–117 and accompanying text.
7 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (referring to ending workplace
discrimination as the primary objective of Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
4
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conduct.8 In this respect, statutory anti-retaliation provisions serve the broader,
primary goal of the statute in question. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
exists to protect the willingness and ability of individuals to oppose or otherwise
participate in the attempt to eliminate employment discrimination. 9 Thus, Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision plays a crucial support role in the fight against
employment discrimination.
Currently, however, courts tend to treat retaliation cases involving third
parties to the employer-employee relationship as strange outliers in the area of
employment retaliation law. Indeed, as this Article discusses, courts frequently
treat such cases as having little connection to employment discrimination law
more generally, despite the vital role that preserving the ability of employees to
sue in the event of retaliation can play in the fight against employment
discrimination. Rather than treating these kinds of retaliation claims—and
retaliation claims more generally—as part and parcel of Title VII’s quest to
eliminate workplace discrimination, courts tend to view such claims as involving
a narrow dispute between the parties in question, instead of having broader
implications.
As the cases involving employer retaliation directed at nonemployees
illustrate, the courts’ often limited view of the role of Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision tends to prevent the provision from reaching its full potential in the
fight against workplace discrimination. These cases illustrate the broad tendency
of courts to adopt narrow interpretations of statutory provisions and judicial
decisions involving employment retaliation. They also illustrate the tendency of
courts to ignore some of the third-party effects of retaliation. This includes the
immediate impact on the individual who suffers an adverse action when an
employee complains about unlawful discrimination occurring in the workplace,
the increased potential for other employees to be subjected to workplace
discrimination when the law permits an employer to engage in retaliation, and
the effects upon society more generally when the law permits workplace
discrimination and retaliation to flourish.
In order to fulfill Title VII’s anti-discrimination purpose, courts need to
approach retaliation cases starting from the premise that robust protection from
retaliation is essential to effectuating the statute’s anti-discrimination purpose.
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L.
REV. 525, 580 (2011) (listing statutes and summarizing their anti-retaliation provisions).
9 See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63 (“[Title VII’s] antiretaliation provision seems to secure that primary
objective [of eliminating discrimination] by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with
an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”).

2022]

THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION PROBLEMS

259

This is as true for cases in which third parties are swept up in a dispute as it is
for other kinds of retaliation cases. A court that keeps the interconnected nature
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination goals in mind is more likely
to give a fair reading to the relevant legal concepts in a retaliation case, including
cases involving third parties.
This Article focuses on these kinds of third-party problems. Part I discusses
the legal principles that are most relevant in the case of employment retaliation
that impacts a third party. Part II discusses the two recurring fact patterns that
serve as the primary focus of this Article: (1) employer retaliation against an
employee for opposing discrimination against a nonemployee; and (2) employer
retaliation against an employee that targets nonemployees. Part III explores
some of the specific problems with the judicial and statutory approaches to these
kinds of retaliation cases. Part IV then addresses how these problems illustrate
some of the broader problems with retaliation law and how those problems limit
the ability of statutory provisions to facilitate the effort to eliminate workplace
discrimination. Part V concludes by offering several suggestions that would
enable courts to more effectively deal with these specific kinds of retaliation
cases as well as retaliation cases more generally.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION PROBLEMS IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
In the typical case in which an employer fires its employee for having
engaged in protected activity, the elements of a Title VII retaliation claim are
fairly straightforward. However, there are sometimes subtleties that may pose
challenges for courts and litigants, particularly where the employer retaliation
involves third parties. These include defining who qualifies as an “employee”
for purposes of the statute, what qualifies as actionable retaliation, and who has
standing to bring a retaliation claim.
A. Retaliation: The Prima Facie Case
Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes prohibit employers
from retaliating against employees who have opposed unlawful employment
discrimination or have made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.10 In order to establish a
prima facie case in the typical retaliation case, the plaintiff must engage in
protected activity, either by opposing what the plaintiff reasonably believes to
10

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
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be discrimination prohibited by the statute (“opposition conduct”) or
participating in an investigation or proceeding pursuant to the statute
(“participation conduct”).11 In addition, the plaintiff must suffer a materially
adverse action, a concept discussed in greater detail below.12 Finally, the
plaintiff must establish a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse action, specifically, that “but for” the plaintiff’s protected activity, the
adverse action would not have occurred.13
B. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.: Who is an Employee?
In the 1997 case of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court dealt with
the issue of who qualifies as an “employee” for purposes of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.14 In Robinson, an individual filed a charge of race
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
after being fired by his employer, Shell Oil, Co.15 Meanwhile, the individual
applied for a new job.16 When the prospective employer contacted Shell Oil,
Co., the company provided a negative reference, allegedly because of the former
employee’s EEOC charge.17 The issue facing the Supreme Court was whether
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision applies to retaliation against former
employees as well as current employees.18
In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that former employees are
included within the coverage of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.19 The
Court concluded that the term “employee” was ambiguous but that the text of
Title VII suggested that the term was more naturally read to include former
employees.20 The Court cited the fact that Title VII specifically references
“discharge” as an unlawful employment practice that gives rise to a
discrimination claim.21 Of course, only former employees can sue for being
wrongfully discharged, thus lending support to the Court’s conclusion that the

11

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
See infra notes 28–36 and accompanying text.
13 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013) (“Title VII retaliation claims must
be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation . . . .”); Rodríguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters
Corps of P.R., 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir. 2014) (summarizing the prima facie case).
14 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 See id. at 340.
19 Id. at 346.
20 Id. at 345.
21 Id.
12
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term “employee” included former employees.22 Similarly, the Court noted that
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who files a charge
with the EEOC.23 Again, this would logically include a former employee who
filed a charge of wrongful discharge.24
Importantly, the Court also looked to the purpose of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision in support of its reading of the statutory text. The Court
observed that the primary purpose of anti-retaliation provisions is to maintain
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”25 If the statutory
protections were limited to only current employees, victims of discrimination
might be deterred from seeking redress for fear of post-employment retaliation
like that alleged in Robinson.26
The Robinson decision is significant for several reasons. First, the decision
reflects an expansive view of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision that relies
heavily on the policy of preventing employers from deterring employees from
speaking out about unlawful employment discrimination. This theme would
reappear repeatedly in subsequent Court decisions involving retaliation.27 In
addition, the decision is significant because it illustrates the point that retaliation
may occur in a variety of ways, not just in the typical situation in which an
employer takes action against a current employee for engaging in protected
activity. By the time the Robinson defendant retaliated against the plaintiff, the
defendant was essentially a third party to the prospective employment
relationship between the plaintiff and her prospective employers. Thus,
Robinson makes clear that retaliation may be actionable under Title VII even
when it occurs outside of the traditional ongoing employer-employee
relationship.
C. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White: What Qualifies as
Actionable Retaliation?
The second Supreme Court decision with particular relevance for instances
of retaliation involving third parties is Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
v. White, a 2006 decision.28 There, employer had allegedly retaliated against an
employee for complaining about discrimination by reassigning her to an
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 346.
See id.
See infra notes 34–35, 45 and accompanying text.
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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objectively less desirable position, but one that still fell under the same job
description.29 The issue facing the Court was whether employer retaliation
against an employee that did not affect the employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment was actionable under Title VII. 30
The Court held that actionable retaliation under Title VII was not limited to
employment-related or workplace actions.31 In addition to the strong text-based
justifications for the holding, the Court again relied heavily upon the purposes
underlying the anti-retaliation provision. The Court observed that the primary
objective of Title VII is to eliminate workplace discrimination.32 The antiretaliation provision exists so that employees are not deterred by their employers
from seeking to oppose or otherwise redress such discrimination.33 Citing
Robinson, the Court noted that the “primary purpose” of the anti-retaliation
provision is to “ensure unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” 34
Thus, the anti-retaliation provision serves to further Title VII’s overarching antidiscrimination goal. In light of this purpose, the most logical way to define what
constitutes “actionable retaliation” was in terms of employer conduct that is
likely to deter the willingness of employees to access these mechanisms.
Therefore, the Court held that employer retaliation is actionable “when a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have “dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”35
Another important aspect of the decision for purposes of this Article is that
this standard potentially includes employer actions that impact employees
outside of the workplace. As an example of employer conduct that might
dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity, the Court
cited an employer’s filing of false criminal charges against a former employee. 36
This feature of the decision illustrates the important principle that employer
retaliation is not always confined to actions impacting individuals within the
employer’s own workplace. but may still be highly effective in deterring future
employees from complaining about unlawful discrimination.

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

See id. at 70.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63.
See id.
Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 64 (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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D. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP: Who is an Aggrieved Person?
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,37 a 2011 decision, represents the
first and only time the Supreme Court has confronted a Title VII retaliation case
involving harm to a third party. In Thompson, the plaintiff and his fiancée were
both employed by the same employer.38 The plaintiff’s fiancée filed an EEOC
charge alleging sex discrimination on the part of the employer.39 The employer,
allegedly in response, fired the plaintiff.40
The issue facing the Court was whether the plaintiff was within the class of
individuals protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision when he was not
the one who had engaged in protected activity.41 Courts were split on this issue
prior to Thompson, with the majority concluding that the affected third party in
these cases did not have a claim under Title VII or other discrimination
statutes.42 In reaching this conclusion, courts tended to focus on the language of
the anti-retaliation provision itself:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.43
According to the majority of courts at the time, the plain language of the
provision requires that the person retaliated against also be the person who
engaged in the protected activity.44 Citing its prior decision in Burlington
Northern, the Thompson court made short work of this argument. The Court
recognized that an employer could retaliate against an employee who had
engaged in protected activity by taking action against a loved one of that
individual rather than the individual herself. And the Court thought it “obvious”
37

562 U.S. 170 (2011).
Id. at 172.
39 Id.
40
Id.
41 See id. at 173.
42 See Long, supra note 2, at 934 (stating that the clear majority of courts had reached this conclusion).
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
44 See Freeman v. Barnhart, No. C 06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL 744827, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008) (“A
majority of courts, including the three circuit courts that have examined this issue, have concluded such claims
are not cognizable; only employees that have personally engaged in statutorily protected activity may bring
retaliation claims.”); Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir. 2002) (reaching this conclusion
with respect to the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir.
1998) (stating that the contrary argument is not supported by the plain language of Title VII).
38
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under the reasoning of Burlington Northern “that a reasonable worker might be
dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fianceé would
be fired.”45
Instead, “the more difficult question” was whether the plaintiff, who had not
engaged in any protected activity, had standing under the statute to sue for his
discharge.46 Title VII provides that “a civil action may be brought . . . by the
person claiming to be aggrieved.”47 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that
the plaintiff could be a person aggrieved by the employer’s illegal retaliation
against his fiancée even though he had not engaged in protected activity
himself.48 Drawing upon decisional law under the Administrative Procedure
Act, the Court held that a person is “aggrieved” when the individual “falls within
the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose
violation forms the legal basis for [the individual’s] complaint.”49 A plaintiff
lacks standing “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”50
Applying that standard to the plaintiff’s situation, the Court cited two reasons
why it believed the plaintiff fell within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. First, the plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant, “and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees
from their employers’ unlawful actions.”51 Second, the employer targeted the
plaintiff specifically in order to harm its other employee for having complained
about the employer’s discrimination.52 Thus, the plaintiff was not merely an
“accidental victim” or “collateral damage” of the employer’s retaliation. 53 As a
result, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was “well within the zone of
interests sought to be protected by Title VII.”54
The remedy provisions of several other federal anti-discrimination statutes
employ the same “aggrieved” person language or incorporate Title VII’s remedy

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011).
Id. at 175.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178.
Id. at 177 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)).
Id. at 178 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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provision.55 Following Thompson, employees who have suffered some type of
adverse action due to the protected activity of a related coworker have generally
been able to at least establish standing.56 Also, consistent with Thompson, courts
have been willing to recognize that employer action targeted at a non-relative
employee with whom an employee is romantically involved, or is at least close
friends with, is likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity
and that the third-party employee has standing.57 Where, however, the
relationship between the two employees is more attenuated or the adverse action
is not materially adverse, courts have been unwilling to recognize the claim of
the third-party employee.58 In addition, where an employer does not take action
55

See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (“Any person aggrieved may bring
a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the
purposes of this chapter.”); Eric Schnapper, Review of Labor and Employment Law Decisions from the United
States Supreme Court’s 2010–11 Term, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 329, 344 (2012) (“A number of statutes . . .
authorize suit by a person or party ‘aggrieved.’ . . . Several statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, allow for enforcement under Title VII itself . . . .”).
56 See, e.g., Norfolk v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-204, 2020 WL 1873991, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15,
2020) (concluding wife had standing to bring retaliation claim under Title VII based on adverse action stemming
from husband’s protected activity); Ehmann v. Oshkosh Corp., No. 19-C-1128, 2019 WL 6173671, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 20, 2019) (concluding wife had standing to bring retaliation claim under Fair Labor Standards Act
based on adverse action stemming from husband’s protected activity); Ferguson v. Fairfield Caterers, Inc., No.
3:11-cv-01558, 2015 WL 2406156, at *4 (D. Conn. May 20, 2015) (concluding daughter could have standing to
bring retaliation claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act based on adverse action stemming from
father’s protected activity); Vormittag v. Unity Elec. Co., No. 12 CV 4116, 2014 WL 4273303, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2014) (concluding father had standing to bring Title VII retaliation claim based on adverse action
stemming from daughter’s protected activity); O’Donnell v. Am. At Home Health Care & Nursing Servs. Ltd.,
No. 12-C-6762, 2013 WL 1686972, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2013) (concluding wife had standing to bring
retaliation claim under Fair Labor Standards Act based on adverse action stemming from husband’s protected
activity).
57 See, e.g., Cobb v. Atria Senior Living, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00291, 2018 WL 587315, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan.
29, 2018) (concluding for purposes of motion to dismiss that a relationship “of friendship and confidence” was
sufficient); Lard v. Ala. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., No. 2:12-cv-452-WHA, 2012 WL 5966617, at *4
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 28, 2012) (recognizing claim where plaintiff was dating coworker who engaged in protected
activity); Harrington v. Career Training Inst. Orlando, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-1817-T-33MAP, 2011 WL 4389870, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2011) (finding standing where action was taken against the fiancé of the employee who
engaged in protected action). There are also the claims in which the employee who engages in protected activity
brings a retaliation claim based on the fact that the employer took action against a friend or loved one. See
generally Ali v. D.C. Gov’t, 810 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that employer’s threat to discipline
and likely discharge employee-friend of plaintiff satisfied Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard);
Crawford v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 3:15-cv-131, 2015 WL 8023680, at *11 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2015)
(holding that employer’s refusal to hire plaintiff’s daughter-in-law satisfied Burlington Northern’s material
adversity standard); Davis v. Ricketts, No. 8:11CV221, 2011 WL 9369010, at *6 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 2011)
(holding that employer’s termination of plaintiff’s son’s employment satisfied Burlington Northern’s material
adversity standard).
58 See, e.g., Gipson v. Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc., No. 2:19cv224-MHT, 2020 WL 1429694,
at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2020) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff did not suffer any injury
due to employer’s retaliation against coworker); Fleming v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 1:17CV418, 2018 WL
1626523, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2018) (granting employer’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff was merely a
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against an employee with the intent to affect the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not
likely to be classified as an aggrieved person and is instead merely an “accidental
victim” who is outside the statute’s zone of interests.59
II. THIRD-PARTY PROBLEMS
Thompson addressed the most common situation in which third parties
become wrapped up in employment discrimination disputes. But since the
decision, new issues involving third parties and employer retaliation have
emerged. To date, there have been two recurring fact patterns that have caused
courts to split.
A. Retaliation Against an Employee for Opposing Discrimination Against a
Nonemployee
One situation in which the presence of a third party has complicated the
typical analysis of a retaliation claim is the situation in which an employer
retaliates against an employee for reporting a coworker’s discrimination toward
a nonemployee, such as a customer or the employee of a different employer. 60

“closely affiliated” coworker); Mackall v. Colvin, No. ELH-12-1153, 2015 WL 412922, at *24 (D. Md. Jan. 29,
2015) (denying claim where plaintiff-employee was merely an acquaintance of employee who engaged in
protected activity); Assariathu v. Lone Star HMA LP, No. 3:11-cv-99-O, 2012 WL 12897341, at *9 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 12, 2012) (granting summary judgment to employer, in part, because two of the plaintiffs did not show
they had anything beyond friendly working relationships with employees who engaged in protected activity).
59 See Cochran v. Five Points Temps., LLC, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (concluding
plaintiff was not within zone of interests because employer did not intend to injure plaintiff).
60 See generally Stimson v. Stryker Sales Corp., 835 F. App’x 993, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (involving alleged
harassment of employee of a different employer); Edwards v. Ambient Healthcare of Ga., Inc., 674 F. App’x
926, 928 (11th Cir. 2017) (involving alleged harassment of patients and caregiver of patient); Jackson v. Motel
6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997) (involving alleged discrimination against
customers); Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2010) (involving alleged police discrimination
against citizens); Crowley v. Prince George’s Cnty., 890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1989) (involving alleged police
harassment of citizens); Cooper-Hill v. Hancock Cnty., No. 5:18-CV-23, 2018 WL 6496775, at *4 (M.D. Ga.
Dec. 10, 2018) (involving alleged discrimination against voters); Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, No. 07-CV0018-CVE-FHM, 2007 WL 1574762, at *3 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007) (involving harassment against members
of the public). This scenario differs from the relatively common fact pattern in which a coworker or third party
harasses an employee. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072–74 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
cases); Einat Albin, Customer Domination at Work: A New Paradigm for the Sexual Harassment of Employees
by Customers, 24 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 167, 202 (2017) (noting that numerous employees have complained
about customer harassment); Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by
Nonemployee: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447, 449 (1994) (stating that this
type of harassment is common). One of the most famous cases involving this scenario is Folkerson v. Circus
Enterprises Inc., which involved an employee who performed as a “living doll” and was harassed by casino
patrons. 107 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1997). It is not uncommon for the complaining employee in these cases to
face retaliation for having made a complaint. See, e.g., Riggs v. DXP Enters., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00729, 2019 WL
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Where a nonemployee harasses an employee, the employer may be held
liable if the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to
take appropriate corrective action.61 Thus, an employer is liable if the employer
is negligent in discovering or preventing the harassment.62 Liability in these
cases is based on an employer’s negligence and is “direct[,] [not] derivative.” 63
The same standard applies to harassment by a coworker.64 In contrast, liability
in the case of supervisor harassment is based on agency principles and is
derivative in nature.65 Because permitting a hostile work environment to exist is
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, an employee who makes an
internal complaint or files a formal charge concerning workplace harassment by
a coworker or third party has engaged in protected activity.66
But employee harassment of a nonemployee presents a different problem.
For example, in Stimson v. Stryker Sales Corp., an unpublished decision from
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, an employee who sold medical
equipment to a hospital reported to his employer that a coworker had sexually
harassed a nurse at the hospital.67 When his employer allegedly retaliated against
him for making this report, the employee brought a retaliation claim under Title
VII.68 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer on the grounds that the employee had not engaged in protected
activity.69 Reporting one coworker’s harassment of another coworker would

5682897, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2019); Thompson v. Panos X Foods, Inc., No. 14-10620, 2016 WL 1615702,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2016) (involving such an allegation).
61 See, e.g., Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2019) (involving
harassment by resident of assisted living facility); EEOC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 627–28 (7th
Cir. 2018) (involving harassment by customer); Dunn v. Washington Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir.
2005) (involving harassment by independent contractor); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2021) (“An employer may
also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the
workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”); see also Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr.,
605 F.3d 951, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2010) (involving harassment by prison inmates).
62 See Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2006).
63 Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691.
64
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799–800 (1998) (noting that courts uniformly judge
employer liability for coworker harassment under a negligence standard).
65 See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1381 (2009) (“[T]he Court grounded
vicarious liability in the agency law principle of ‘misuse of supervisory authority,’ in which the agent is ‘aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.’” (internal citations omitted)).
66 See Riggs, 2019 WL 5682897, at *4; Thompson, 2016 WL 1615702, at *4.
67 Stimson v. Stryker Sales Corp., 835 F. App’x 993, 995 (11th Cir. 2020).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 998.
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easily qualify as protected opposition conduct.70 But here, the employer did not
employ the victim.71 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had not opposed
conduct that was actually unlawful under Title VII because the victim of the
discrimination was not an employee of the employer who is alleged to have
violated Title VII.72
The employee also alleged that he had engaged in protected activity because
he reasonably believed the employer’s conduct was unlawful under Title VII
even if it was not actually unlawful.73 As interpreted by courts, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects an individual who opposes what the individual
reasonably believes is unlawful discrimination under Title VII, even if conduct
does not actually amount to unlawful discrimination.74 Therefore, the plaintiff
in Stimson also argued that he engaged in protected activity because he
reasonably believed that his coworker’s harassment of the nonemployee was
unlawful under Title VII.75 But, in granting summary judgment to the employer,
the trial court held, without explanation, that the plaintiff could not have
reasonably believed that this harassment was unlawful under Title VII. 76
Ultimately, because the victim of the coworker’s harassment was a third party
to the employment relationship between the plaintiff and his employer, the
plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity.77 Other courts have reached this
same conclusion.78
In a similar instance, an employer allegedly retaliated against an employee
for reporting that a coworker had sexually harassed the employer’s customers.79
In concluding that the plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity, the
70 See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, at II.A.2.e. Example 4 (Aug. 25,
2016) (explaining that an employee who complains to her supervisor about graffiti in her workplace that is
derogatory
toward
women
has
engaged
in
protected
activity),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-retaliation-and-related-issues#li_Complaining.
71 Stimson, 835 F. App’x at 996.
72 See id.
73 See Stimson v. Stryker, No. 1:17-CV-00872-WMR-JFK, 2019 WL 2240444, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 24,
2019).
74 See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (applying a reasonable person standard).
75
Stimson, 2019 WL 2240444 at *12.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., Edwards v. Ambient Healthcare of Ga., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-0411-TCB-LTW, 2015 WL
13298082, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2015) (holding that employee could not have had a reasonable belief that
coworker’s harassment of customer was unlawful under Title VII), aff’d, 674 F. App’x 926 (11th Cir. 2017);
Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that public safety officer could not have
reasonably believed that her reports of discriminatory police traffic stops that also referenced potential impact
on hiring practices were in opposition to any conduct actually unlawful under Title VII).
79 Edwards v. Ambient Healthcare of Ga., Inc., 674 F. App’x 926, 927 (11th Cir. 2017).
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Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision only protects employees who oppose an “‘employment practice made
unlawful’ by Title VII.”80 Since sexual harassment of a customer is not an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII, the employer’s conduct was not
actually unlawful.81 Nor, according to the trial court, could the plaintiff have
reasonably believed that such conduct was unlawful.82 Thus, the employee’s
opposition conduct was not protected.83
In another case, a federal court found that a deputy fire chief had not engaged
in protected activity because he could not have reasonably believed that it was
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII for other firefighters to
sexually harass a member of the public while participating in a work-related
training program or while traveling in a fire department vehicle.84 According to
the court, “it is only reasonable to believe that the underlying conduct was
unlawful under Title VII if ‘the person against whom the hostility is directed [is]
in an employment relationship with the employer.’”85
Employees who allegedly faced retaliation after having opposed unlawful
discrimination directed at third parties have also lost on related grounds. Under
some state employment discrimination statutes, an employee is protected from
retaliation when the employee engages in activity that is protected under a more
general whistleblower statute, as opposed to simply an employment
discrimination statute.86 In such cases, an employee may be protected from
retaliation if the employee reports employer conduct made unlawful by some
other statute. In contrast, Title VII only prohibits retaliation against one who
opposes conduct made unlawful specifically under Title VII.87 Some employees
have lost their retaliation claims because they opposed unlawful discriminatory
conduct occurring during the course of their jobs, but the conduct was not
unlawful under Title VII.88
80

See id. at 930 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
Id.
82 See Edwards, 2015 WL 13298082, at *6.
83 See Edwards, 684 F. App’x at 930.
84
Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, No. 07-CV-0018-CVE-FHM, 2007 WL 1574762, at *4 (N.D. Okla.
May 29, 2007).
85 Id. (quoting Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 1999)).
86 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (2019) (providing that it is “unlawful employment
discrimination . . . [f]or any employer . . . to discharge an employee or discriminate with respect to . . . transfer,
. . . terms, [or] conditions” because of actions taken that are protected by Whistleblower Protection Act).
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
88 See, e.g., Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a public employee
who complained about police department’s biased policing practices did not engage in protected activity under
Title VII); Crowley v. Prince George’s Cnty., 890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a public
81
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For example, in Cooper-Hill v. Hancock County, a case from a federal
district court in Georgia, an employee of a local elections board alleged that her
employer retaliated against her after she complained about another employee’s
discriminatory actions in an attempt to increase the white vote in the area.89 In
effect, the employee complained about the fact that a coworker was engaging in
discrimination in the performance of her job.90 While racially discriminatory
election practices may be unlawful under another statute, they are not unlawful
under Title VII.91 And, in Cooper-Hill, the court concluded that the employee
could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that she was opposing
conduct made unlawful under Title VII, even though the employee’s job
revolved around election practices.92 As such, she had not engaged in protected
activity under Title VII.93 Summing up its reasoning, the court observed that
“[a]lleged discriminatory actions toward nonemployee third parties is not an
employment practice made unlawful by Title VII.”94
B. Employer Retaliation Targeting Nonemployee Third Parties
Thompson involved the situation in which an employer retaliates against one
employee by targeting another employee.95 The other third-party retaliation
scenario that has emerged since Thompson involves the employer who takes
action against a nonemployee third party in order to retaliate against an employee
who engages in protected activity.96 Such action could range from seeking to
harm the nonemployee’s business97 to inducing another employer to discharge
the individual.98 In this respect, these kinds of claims resemble the tort law

employee who investigated claims of racial harassment of citizens by police officers had not engaged in
protected activity under Title VII).
89 No. 5:18-CV-23, 2018 WL 6496775, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2018).
90 Id.
91 Id. at *4.
92 Id.
93 Id.; see also Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding
plaintiffs could not proceed on a Title VII retaliation claim for opposing employer’s unlawful discrimination
with respect to public accommodations because Title VII did not prohibit such discrimination).
94
Cooper-Hill, 2018 WL 6496775, at *4.
95 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
96 Cf., e.g., Simmons v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 972 F.3d 664, 665 (5th Cir. 2020); Tolar v. Bradley Arant
Boult Cummings, No. 2:13-cv-00132-JEO, 2014 WL 3974671, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2014), aff’d, 997 F.3d
1280 (11th Cir. 2021); Underwood v. Dep’t Fin. Servs. Fla., No. 4:11cv466-RH/CAS, 2012 WL 12897085, at
*1, *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012); Crawford v. George & Lynch, Inc., No. 10-949-GMS-SRF, 2012 WL 2674546,
at *1 (D. Del. July 5, 2012); McGhee v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., No. 5:10-cv-279-RS-EMT, 2011 WL 5299660,
at *3 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2011).
97 Cf. Tolar, 2014 WL 3974671, at *3–4.
98 Cf. McGhee, 2011 WL 5299660, at *3.
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theory of interference with contract.99 In an effort to retaliate against its own
employee, an employer interferes with the existing relationship between the
nonemployee and the nonemployee’s employer or other contracting partner. 100
So far, courts have split on the question of whether Title VII provides protection
from retaliation to a nonemployee third party in these kinds of cases. 101
1. The Majority Approach: A Narrow Interpretation of the Aggrieved
Person Concept
The Fifth Circuit’s 2020 decision in Simmons v. UBS Financial Services,
Inc.102 represents the narrow—and the majority—approach to this issue. In
Simmons, the plaintiff was employed by a company as a third-party wholesaler
of life insurance products to clients of the defendant, UBS Financial Services.103
Given the nature of his job, the plaintiff frequently worked out of UBS’s offices,
where his daughter was employed.104 The plaintiff’s daughter filed an internal
complaint and EEOC charge alleging pregnancy discrimination on the part of
UBS.105 UBS allegedly retaliated by revoking the plaintiff’s access to its
premises and forbidding him from doing business with UBS’s clients, thereby
effectively ending his employment with his own employer.106
The question facing the Fifth Circuit was whether the plaintiff had standing
to bring a Title VII retaliation claim when he had not personally engaged in
protected activity and, unlike in Thompson, was not an employee of the
defendant.107 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior decision, the court
determined whether the plaintiff was a “person aggrieved” by the employer’s
retaliation.108 In other words, were his interests “within the zone of interests”
sought to be protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision?109 In answering
99

See id. at *2–3 (detailing the plaintiff’s interference and statutory retaliation claims).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes
with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing
or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.”).
101 Applicants for employment who have been denied employment, allegedly based on the fact that an
employee who happened to be a family member had engaged in protected activity, have been found to have
standing. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. 07–CV–0300 JAP/LFG, 2011 WL 8076831, at *6–8
(D.N.M. Oct. 26, 2011).
102 972 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1382 (2021).
103 Id. at 665.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 666–67.
108 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177 (2011).
109 Id. at 178; see supra note 49–50 and accompanying text.
100
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this question, the Fifth Circuit relied most heavily on the Thompson Court’s
observation that the plaintiff in Thompson was an employee of the defendant,
“and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’
unlawful actions.”110 To the Fifth Circuit, this largely resolved the issue: “It
would be a remarkable extension of Thompson—and of Title VII generally—to
rule that a nonemployee has the right to sue.”111
To the court, the language of Title VII also pointed to the conclusion that
“the zone of interests that Title VII protects is limited to those in employment
relationships with the defendant.”112 The court observed that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer from retaliating against “his
employees or applicants.”113 The court further noted that Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision—which speaks of discrimination concerning “the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”—sheds further light on the
statute’s overall purpose.114 To the court, these provisions pointed to the
conclusion that the interests covered by Title VII are “the interests of those in
employment relationships with the defendant.”115 As such, the plaintiff’s
interests, as a nonemployee, were, “at best, only ‘marginally related to’ the
purposes of Title VII.”116 Other courts have similarly relied heavily on the fact
that the plaintiff was not an employee of the employer in concluding that the
plaintiff was outside the zone of interests for purposes of a retaliation claim.117
2. The Minority Approach: A More Expansive Interpretation of the
Aggrieved Person Concept
Under the minority approach, a nonemployee third party who suffers an
adverse action as a result of the protected activity of an employee can be a person

110

Id.
Simmons, 972 F.3d at 668.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 669 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) (alteration in original).
114 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
115
Id. (citing Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178).
116 Id. (citation omitted).
117 See, e.g., Underwood v. Dep’t Fin. Servs. Fla., No. 4:11cv466-RH/CAS, 2012 WL 12897085, at *3
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012) (“[U]nless the plaintiffs [sic] own employer has committed an ‘unlawful employment
practice,’ the plaintiff has no claim under the Title VII antiretaliation provision.”); Crawford v. George & Lynch,
Inc., No. 10-949-GMS-SRF, 2012 WL 2674546, at *3, *8 (D. Del. July 5, 2012) (recommending granting motion
to dismiss for employer and stating that the Supreme Court in Thompson “held that the plaintiff fell within the
zone of interests protected by Title VII because he was an employee of the defendant”); Russell v. City of Tupelo,
544 F. Supp. 3d 741, 752 (N.D. Miss. 2021) (finding the fact that the plaintiff was, unlike in Simmons, an
employee to be critical in concluding that plaintiff had standing).
111
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aggrieved by the employer’s unlawful retaliation.118 The EEOC’s 2016
Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues adopts this
approach.119 In its Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC notes that “if an employer
punishes an employee for engaging in protected activity by cancelling a vendor
contract with the employee’s husband (even though he was employed by a
contractor, not the employer), it would dissuade a reasonable worker from
engaging in protected activity.”120 In such a case, “both the employee who
engaged in the protected activity and the third party who is subjected to the
materially adverse action may state a claim.”121 The employee would clearly
have a claim under Thompson.122 But, according to the EEOC, the third party
would also fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII
and would qualify as an aggrieved person.123
A few courts have also adopted this view. In Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings, an employee filed discrimination and retaliation claims against her
employer, alleging that her superior had sexually harassed her and that she had
been fired after complaining about the harassment.124 The employer also
allegedly retaliated by taking action against the employee’s family, including
discouraging customers from doing business with her father, pursuing an
allegedly baseless fraud claim against the father and other family members,
publicizing the existence of the fraud action within the community, and
garnishing the father’s wages.125 These actions allegedly resulted in, among
other things, the father being forced to shut down his business and file for
bankruptcy.126 Claiming to be aggrieved persons under the logic of Thompson,
the affected family members filed their own retaliation claim against the
employer under Title VII.127

118 See, e.g., Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, No. 2:13-cv-00132-JEO, 2014 WL 3974671, at *10
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2014), aff’d, 997 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2021); McGhee v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., No. 5:10cv-279-RS-EMT, 2011 WL 5299660, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2011); EEOC, Enforcement Guidance on
Retaliation and Related Issues (Aug. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/2LTJ-EHJY; see also City of Los Angeles v.
Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1056–57 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (reaching similar conclusion under Fair
Housing Act Amendments).
119 EEOC, supra note 118.
120
Id.
121 Id.
122 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011).
123 EEOC, supra note 118.
124 No. 2:13–cv–00132–JEO, 2014 WL 3974671, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2014), aff’d, 997 F.3d 1280
(11th Cir. 2021).
125 See id. at *3–4.
126 Id. at *4. One of the other family members was a law student, who was forced to report the fraud action
against him on his bar application. Id.
127 Id. at *8.
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The employer argued that the plaintiffs could not establish a violation of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision and that they were not aggrieved persons because
there was no employment relationship between them and the employer.128 The
Tolar court acknowledged that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision requires that
the employer retaliated against “his employee[] or applicant[]” because that
individual engaged in protected activity.129 The family members were, of course,
neither employees nor applicants. But the court observed that Thompson had
already made clear that this provision may be satisfied when an employer
retaliates against an employee who has engaged in protected activity by taking
action against a third party.130 In addition, the court observed that the Supreme
Court had previously decided in Robinson that Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision prohibits an employer from retaliating against a former employee for
engaging in protected activity.131 This was essentially the same situation as
alleged in the case at bar—by taking action against the family member, the
employer was retaliating against a former employee. Finally, the court observed,
the Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern decision made clear that retaliation
may be actionable even where “its effects are felt only outside the workplace,”
which, again, was the situation in the plaintiff’s case.132 Based on prior Supreme
Court precedent, the court found the question of whether an employer may
violate Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision by taking action against a
nonemployee to be a “relatively simple one” and held that such conduct may be
actionable.133
The employer also argued that the plaintiffs were not “aggrieved” under Title
VII because they were not employees and had not sustained injuries in their
status as employees.134 The Tolar court began by noting that the zone of interests
test employed in Thompson “is not meant to be especially demanding.”135
Provided a plaintiff has an interest “arguably sought to be protected by the
statutes,” the plaintiff has statutory standing.136 In addition, the court rejected
any argument that Title VII standing is contingent on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the defendant and plaintiff.137 While
128

Id. at *9.
Id. at *10 (quoting Underwood v. Dep’t Fin. Servs. Fla., 518 F. App’x 617, 642–43 (11th Cir. 2013)).
130 See id.
131 Id. at *9 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1997)).
132 Id. at *10.
133 Id. at *9–10.
134 See id. at *11.
135 Id. (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225
(2012)).
136 Id. (quoting Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011)).
137 See id. at *11.
129
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the Supreme Court did identify the existence of an employment relationship as
a relevant consideration in Thompson, the Court also identified as relevant the
fact that the plaintiff in Thompson was not “an accidental victim of the
retaliation.”138 And, like the Tolar plaintiffs, “the employer’s intended means of
harming” the Thompson plaintiff was to harm a third party.139
Even if, as Thompson said, the purpose of Title VII “is to protect employees
from their employers’ unlawful actions,” the Tolar court argued that purpose
could still be furthered by permitting nonemployees to recover for retaliation
targeted at an employee.140 “The essence of [Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision] is that it safeguards the right of employees (and applicants for
employment) to engage in protected activity by punishing employers who would
take materially adverse action in retaliation.”141 This is precisely what allegedly
occurred in Tolar: the defendant’s employee engaged in protected activity and
the employer retaliated by taking action—harming the employee’s loved ones—
that would dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in the protected activity.
While the plaintiffs’ situation may not have been what Congress primarily had
in mind when it approved Title VII, their injuries were still within the zone of
interests protected by the statute.142
It bears mentioning that despite this more expansive reading of the “zone of
interests” test by the district court in Tolar, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals subsequently expressed serious doubt on appeal about the district
court’s conclusion.143 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit echoed the Fifth
Circuit’s observation in Simmons that the plaintiffs were not employees of the
employer, and, therefore, it was debatable whether they were within Title VII’s
zone of interests.144 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding,
that the plaintiffs had standing, and granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on other grounds.145

138

Id. at *11–12 (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178).
Id. at *12 (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178).
140 Id. (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S. at 178).
141 Id.
142 See id. (“Plaintiffs . . . are not who the anti-retaliation provision has primarily in mind. Nonetheless,
Thompson makes clear that injuries to such a party may be within the zone of interests where an employer has
purposefully targeted him because of his close association with an employee that has engaged in protected
activity.”).
143 Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1297 (11th Cir. 2021).
144 Id.
145 Id.
139
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III. SOME PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS REGARDING THE NARROW APPROACH TO
THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION CASES
The decisions taking a narrow approach to these types of third-party
retaliation cases are problematic for a number of reasons. Before considering
how these decisions are flawed on a broad, policy-based level, it is worth noting
how the decisions are arguably flawed on a doctrinal level. In both of the
situations previously described, the majority of courts have engaged in an
excessively cramped interpretation of existing retaliation jurisprudence and Title
VII’s statutory text as it applies to third-party retaliation cases.
A. Preliminary Problems with Decisions Involving Retaliation Against an
Employee for Opposing Discrimination Against a Nonemployee
Consider the decisions in which an employee witnesses a coworker harass a
customer or the employee of a customer.146 Courts have held that the
complaining employee has not engaged in protected activity because the conduct
complained of is not unlawful under Title VII.147 Nor, according to some courts,
could an employee reasonably believe that such conduct is unlawful under Title
VII.148 There are two fundamental problems with these decisions.
The first is simply that, contrary to the conclusion of these courts, one
employee’s harassment of a third party potentially can be unlawful under Title
VII if the harassment contributes to the hostile work environment of another
employee. An employer may violate Title VII by permitting a workplace
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”149 It is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to permit a hostile work environment to
exist as the result of harassment by employees and customers. 150 In addition, it
is well-established that an employee may experience a hostile work environment
when the workplace is filled with racial slurs or misogynistic behavior, even if
the employee is not specifically targeted for harassment.151 Logically, then, an
146

See supra notes 60–83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60–83 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Rev. Bd., 476 F.3d 847, 851 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Davis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1998)).
150 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
151 See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f racial hostility pervades a
workplace, a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII, even if such hostility was not directly targeted at
the plaintiff.”).
147
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employee who is required to be in the presence of a coworker could experience
a hostile work environment as a result of the coworker’s harassment of a third
party. Indeed, there is decisional law under Title VII to the effect that
discrimination targeted at a nonemployee may give rise to a claim by an
employee over the resulting discriminatory work environment.152 Therefore, an
employee who complains about such conduct could very well be engaging in
protected activity.
In addition, the decisions are flawed because they take a remarkably strict
view of what a reasonable employee could or could not believe when it comes
to harassment of a nonemployee. An employee engages in protected activity
when the employee reasonably believes the conduct complained of is unlawful
under Title VII or other applicable statute, even if the conduct is not actually
illegal.153 Even if a court incorrectly adopts a bright-line rule that harassment
directed at a third party cannot ever amount to an unlawful employment practice,
an employee would hardly be unreasonable in believing that it was unlawful.
For example, there is authority under state anti-discrimination law for the
proposition that an employer may be held liable for an employee’s harassment
of a nonemployee who is working at the employer’s facilities.154 While the
decision involved a state statute as opposed to Title VII, it is difficult to see how
an employee could be unreasonable in believing that Title VII might reach such
conduct when such conduct is actually unlawful under an analogous statute.
B. Preliminary Problems with Decisions Involving Employer Retaliation
Impacting Nonemployee Third Parties
The main problem with the decisions refusing to recognize nonemployees as
capable of being persons aggrieved by an employer’s retaliation is the
exceedingly cramped view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson and
the zone of interests test more generally.155 As the district court in Tolar noted,
the zone of interests test is not meant to be an especially demanding standard. 156
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated as much, and there are numerous
appellate decisions expressing some variation on this theme.157 A plaintiff must
152 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238–39 (5th Cir. 1971); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,
594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010).
153 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
154 Neal v. Manpower Int’l Inc., No. 3:00-CV-277/LAC, 2001 WL 1923127, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17,
2001).
155 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177–78 (2011).
156 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
157 E.g., Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)
(quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)); Fla. Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
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only show that he is “arguably within the zone of interests sought to be
protected.”158 The Court has explained that its inclusion of the word “arguably”
was meant “to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.”159
The courts that take the position that only one who is in an employment
relationship with an employer may be a person aggrieved by the employer’s
retaliatory conduct pay little attention to these ideas. The text of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision and the text of the entire statute certainly suggest that
nonemployees were not on Congress’s mind when it enacted Title VII. 160 But
the Supreme Court has observed that “there need be no indication of
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff” in order to satisfy the
test.161 The primary purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation command is to ensure
the willingness and ability of individuals to come forward in the fight against
workplace discrimination. There can be no doubt that taking action against a
loved one of an employee—regardless of whether the loved one is an
employee—can be an effective way of deterring employees from opposing
unlawful discrimination or filing charges. The fact that the plaintiff in Thompson
fell “well within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII”
suggests that the Court viewed Thompson as an easy case in view of the purposes
of Title VII.162 Therefore, it is difficult to see how, under the appropriate facts,
a nonemployee who suffers harm as a result of an employer’s retaliation against
an employee could not arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by
Title VII.
IV. HOW THE NARROW APPROACH TO RETALIATION CASES INVOLVING THIRD
PARTIES ILLUSTRATES THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION
LAW MORE GENERALLY
The failure of some courts to provide a remedy in the types of third-party
retaliation cases described in this Article also highlights broader problems with
703 F.3d 1230, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[The ‘zone of interests’] test ‘requires only that the relationship between
the plaintiff’s alleged interest and the purposes implicit in the substantive provision be more than marginal.’”
(quoting Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1526 (11th Cir. 1993)));
Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy Shaw Found. ex rel Black Emps. of Libr. of Cong., Inc. v. Billington, 737 F.3d
767, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (stating that the “zone of interests” test “poses a low bar”).
158 Patchak, 567 U.S. at 224 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970) (emphasis added)).
159 Id. at 225.
160 For example, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision itself speaks only of “employees or applicants for
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
161 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399–400.
162 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011).
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the current approach to workplace retaliation. Providing robust protection from
retaliation is an effective means of addressing employment discrimination. But,
as these types of third-party cases illustrate, the effectiveness of statutory antiretaliation provisions in general is limited by the narrow language of such
provisions and the often-cramped judicial interpretation given to them.
A. The Shortcomings of the Reasonable Belief Standard
One of the rules that does the most to limit the reach of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is the rule requiring that an employee must have a
reasonable belief that the conduct the employee opposes is unlawful. As
discussed, when some employees have faced retaliation for reporting
discrimination occurring in the workplace that was directed at nonemployees,
they have lost on the their retaliation claims on the grounds that the employees
could not have reasonably believed that such discrimination was unlawful under
Title VII.163 While the conduct an employee opposes does not need to be actually
unlawful under Title VII for the opposition to be protected, the employee’s belief
that the conduct is unlawful must be reasonable.164 But many courts have
adopted a highly demanding standard of reasonableness.165
For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals takes the position that
“[w]here binding precedent squarely holds that particular conduct is not an
unlawful employment practice by the employer, and no decision of this Court or
of the Supreme Court has called that precedent into question or undermined its
reasoning, an employee’s contrary belief that the practice is unlawful is
unreasonable.”166 Ignorance of the substantive law is not an excuse.167 As
Professors Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman note, “[t]he reasonableness
163

See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively
Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1127, 1129 & n.7 (2007) (noting that every federal circuit recognizes this standard).
165 See Matthew W. Green, Jr., What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness? Rejecting a Case-Law
Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 759, 793 (2014) (“The caselaw litmus test is also problematic because employees have been required to understand the law as interpreted
by a particular court even if there is conflicting authority from another court or the EEOC.”); Deborah L. Brake
& Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 919 (2008)
(“Perhaps the most problematic turn in the reasonable belief cases . . . is the increasing stringency of courts in
measuring the reasonableness of employee beliefs in discrimination as a matter of law.”); Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005) (“The reasonable belief requirement has generated a highly problematic
body of case law.”); Long, supra note 2, at 955 (“[C]ourts appear to hold an employee to the standard of what a
reasonable labor and employment attorney would believe, rather than what a reasonable employee would
believe.”).
166 Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2008).
167 Id.
164
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of the employee’s belief is measured by existing law, and courts charge
employees with full knowledge of existing law—including circuit-specific
precedents—even if an employee had a good faith belief that the law reached
farther.”168 The burdens that this standard imposes on employees might not be
so difficult if employment discrimination law was clear and intuitive. But the
reality is that employment discrimination law is so complex that it is difficult for
non-lawyer employees—and even some lawyers—to know what qualifies as an
unlawful employment practice even if it were assumed that the employees
actually have some familiarity with existing law.169 In some instances, courts
have found an employee’s belief about the unlawful nature of an employer’s
behavior to be unreasonable, despite the fact that there is decisional law or
EEOC guidance suggesting that the conduct in question really was unlawful.170
If courts were being intellectually honest when explaining what standard they
actually employ, they would say that employees must be correct or substantially
correct in their beliefs or that an employee’s belief must be that of a reasonable
labor and employment lawyer.171
Compounding the difficulty for some retaliation plaintiffs is the fact that they
have received messages from their employers on the subject of discrimination
that actually encourages them to err on the side of reporting suspected unlawful
conduct. One way that employers seek to limit their liability for workplace
harassment is by providing training to employees on the subject.172 More than
half of employers currently provide such training.173 Virtually all employers
have also adopted written policies encouraging employees to report instances of
coworker harassment to management.174 As Professor Deborah L. Brake has
noted, some of these policies define harassment in ways broader than what

168

See Brake & Grossman, supra note 165, at 919.
See Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation
Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1494–95 (2007) (noting how conflicting legal standards concerning what
qualifies as sexual harassment make it difficult for employees to understand what qualifies as an unlawful
employment practice for purposes of the reasonable belief requirement).
170 See Long, supra note 2, at 955 (citing a court decision that the employee lacked a reasonable belief that
conduct complained of was unlawful when the EEOC Interpretive Guidance had concluded that similar conduct
was unlawful).
171 Id.
172 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 62–63 (2018) (noting the use of training
as a means of addressing workplace harassment).
173 See Joanna Grossman, Sexual Harassment in the Post-Weinstein World, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 943,
970 (2021).
174 See id. (stating that within one year of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, 97% of
employers had such policies); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 133–34 (noting
employers’ reliance on internal reporting mechanisms).
169
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would be deemed actionable under existing law.175 She notes that these types of
policies “have expanded popular understanding of the meaning of
discrimination.”176 The EEOC’s regulations also expressly encourage employers
to sensitize their employees to the issue of harassment and inform employees of
their right to raise the issue of harassment.177
Through their training and policies, employers not only provide their
employees with broad definitions of employment discrimination, but they
strongly encourage employees to report suspected discrimination before it
becomes severe or pervasive.178 Therefore, it would hardly be surprising for
some employees, after having been sensitized to the issue of workplace
harassment, to believe that a coworker’s harassment of a nonemployee in the
course of the coworker’s duties is unlawful and should be reported. Yet, as Brake
notes, many courts “have neglected to consider how employer harassment
policies influence employees’ perceptions and responses.”179 All too often, the
result is that courts are quick to conclude that no reasonable employee could
have believed that the conduct they reported to their employers was unlawful.180
Employees have other incentives to err on the side of making an internal
report of possible harassment. As the law is currently structured, an employee
who fails to utilize an employer’s internal complaint procedure concerning
discrimination may be precluded from recovering damages. Under the test
devised by the Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton181 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,182 an employer may avoid liability for a
supervisor’s harassment not resulting in a tangible employment action where the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.183
This would naturally include the failure to report suspected harassment in
accordance with an employer’s internal complaint policy. Thus, employees are
told that the failure to report what they suspect to be harassment may mean they
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Brake, supra note 174, at 144.
Id. at 157.
177
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2021).
178 See Brake, supra note 174, at 144 (“[E]mployer policies typically encourage or even require employees
to report any harassing behaviors right away, without waiting for the incidents to accumulate until they become
severe or pervasive.”).
179 Id. at 139.
180 See id. (“Courts applying the reasonable belief doctrine to harassment complaints give scant attention to
how employer policies define harassment and direct employees to handle it.”).
181 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
182 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
183 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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lose the right to recover damages. But, if they do complain, and their belief that
the conduct was unlawful is unreasonable, the employer is free to retaliate in any
manner the employer sees fit.184
While these rules apply most often in the case of an employee who is the
actual victim of perceived discrimination, they may also apply in the case of an
employee who complains about discrimination against a third party or assists a
coworker who complains about such discrimination.185 In some cases, the thirdparty victim may be another employee. But the victim could also be a
nonemployee. In such cases, courts unrealistically expect the reporting
employee to know, for example, that harassment directed at an independent
contractor is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII or that
harassment directed at some other nonemployee is not unlawful even when it
occurs within the scope of an employee’s employment.186 The effect is to deny
coverage to the employee who, in good faith, reports such conduct on the
grounds that the employee did not engage in protected activity.
In one strange example, an employee of one employer who was assigned to
work at another employer’s facility experienced a pattern of harassment by the
other employees.187 Her own employer fired her after she complained about this
harassment.188 The plaintiff sued her employer on the grounds that it did not
adequately respond to her complaints about a hostile work environment and that
it retaliated against her for her complaints about the hostile work environment.189
The trial court made quick work of the hostile work environment claim, granting
summary judgment on the grounds that the conduct of the nonemployees was
not severe or pervasive.190 Even if the conduct of the third parties was not severe
or pervasive, the employee could have engaged in protected activity if she
reasonably believed that it was.191 But the fissured nature of the workforce
presented a special problem for the employee’s retaliation claim. According to
the trial court, the employee could not have reasonably believed that she had
engaged in protected activity when she reported the harassment by third parties
to her employer because her employer lacked the ability and authority to correct
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See Rosenthal, supra note 157, at 1129–30 (discussing this conundrum).
See Long, supra note 2, at 957–60 (discussing this scenario).
186 See supra notes 67–85 and accompanying text.
187 Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2019).
188 Id. at 61.
189 See id. at 56.
190 Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d 155, 168–69 (D. Me. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
914 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2019).
191 Id. at 169.
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the alleged harassing behavior.192 Only the other employer’s supervisors had the
ability and authority to discipline or discharge offending employees. 193
Therefore, the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity, and the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.194
The reasonable belief standard may also work to limit recovery where an
employer takes action against the nonemployee friend or family member of an
employee who complains about perceived discrimination. If a complaining
employee’s belief that she was discriminated against is determined to be
unreasonable, the employee’s complaint is not protected.195 Logically, this
would also mean that a friend or family member who suffered harm as a result
of an employer’s retaliation would not have a claim. Thus, not only does the
reasonable belief standard adversely impact employees who complain about
discrimination targeted at third parties, it may also adversely impact third parties
who are themselves the victims of employer retaliation.
B. The Shortcomings of Title VII’s Narrow Statutory Language
Cases involving retaliation and third parties illustrate another, broader
shortcoming of current employment retaliation law: the often-narrow nature of
the language employed in anti-retaliation provisions. In some respects, the antiretaliation provisions found in Title VII and other major employment
discrimination statutes are fairly broad. But in other respects, the statutory
language is, by its nature, fairly limited.
1. Language Prohibiting an Employer from Retaliating Against “His
Employees”
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits “an employer” from retaliating
against “any of his employees” because the employee has engaged in protected
activity.196 This language limits the reach of the provision, particularly in the
kinds of scenarios discussed in this Article. For example, in a federal decision
from Florida, the plaintiff sued his employer, a state agency, alleging that his
employer fired him because his wife had filed a discrimination charge against a
different state agency.197 The court treated the two agencies as separate
192

See id.
See id.
194 Id. at 170.
195 See id. at 169–70.
196 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
197 Underwood v. Dep’t Fin. Servs. Fla., No. 4:11cv466-RH/CAS, 2012 WL 12897085, at *1 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2012).
193

284

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:255

employers.198 According to the court, “[t]here [was] simply no way” to read Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision so that it prohibits an employer from taking
action against an employee because a nonemployee engaged in protected activity
concerning a different employer.199
Under a literal reading of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the court’s
conclusion is probably correct. To use the language of the statute, the plaintiff’s
employer may have discriminated against one of “his employees,” but it did not
do so “because he”—the employee—had engaged in protected activity.200
Instead, the employer discriminated against the plaintiff because his wife had
accused a separate employer of discrimination. In addition, the case is
distinguishable from Thompson insofar that the plaintiff and the employee
engaging in the protected activity were not both employed by the same
employer.201 And, under the majority approach to retaliation cases involving
retaliatory acts directed at nonemployees, the plaintiff would not be a person
aggrieved by the employer’s conduct because, according to these courts, the
inclusion of the “his employees” language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision indicates a congressional intent to exclude nonemployees from the
protection of the statute in these instances.202
The anti-retaliation language of other statutes, however, is sometimes not so
limited. For example, the ADA’s anti-retaliation prohibits “a person”—not just
an employer—from retaliating against “any individual” who has engaged in
protected activity.203 Some state statutes take a similar approach. 204 This type of
language has been held to apply to the situation in which a third party persuades
an employer to fire one of its employees for having engaged in protected activity,
such as the situation in which a business demands that a contractor fire one of
its employees for complaining about discrimination by the business. 205 This type
of language has also been held to extend coverage to an independent contractor
when an employer retaliates against the contractor for opposing harassment by
198

Id.
Id. at *3.
200 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
201
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 170 (2011).
202 See supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text.
203 See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Despite the inclusion of the “person” language, courts have consistently held
that there is no individual liability under the ADA. See, e.g., Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 404 n.6
(6th Cir. 1997).
204 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4633(1) (2022); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.210(1) (2022).
205 See, e.g., Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 71 (1st Cir. 2019) (involving this scenario); Me.
Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. Saddleback, Inc., No. CV-06-219, 2008 WL 6875449, at *8 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 31,
2008) (holding that ski resort violated statute by demanding that contractor fire one of its employees because the
employee had engaged in protected activity).
199

2022]

THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION PROBLEMS

285

a coworker, including where that coworker is another contractor.206 These kinds
of statutes illustrate the limited nature of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision in
an age in which the traditional workplace consisting merely of an employer and
its employees is increasingly becoming outdated.
2. The Absence of Language Providing a Remedy to an Individual
Aggrieved by an Employer’s Retaliation
The Title VII cases involving an employer who retaliates against an
employee by taking action against a nonemployee illustrate another shortcoming
of the language of the anti-retaliation provisions of some statutes. As discussed,
Title VII and some other major employment discrimination statutes contain the
aggrieved person standard, which, at least under the minority approach, might
provide a remedy to a third party who is made to suffer for the “sins” of an
employee who engages in protected activity.207 But not all statutes contain this
language.208 The result under such a statute is likely to be twofold: (1) unlike in
Thompson, a nonemployee who suffers harm because an employee engaged in
protected activity is unlikely to have a retaliation claim, and (2) a nonemployee
who actually engages in an otherwise protected activity is also unlikely to have
a claim.
For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) does not contain
Title VII’s aggrieved person language, and only provides a remedy to an
“employee.”209 In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a nonemployee does not have an FMLA retaliation claim when an
employer takes action against the nonemployee for opposing unlawful
discrimination against an employee.210 The case involved an individual who was
appointed by an elected official to serve in a position.211 The individual refused
206 See Sambasivan v. Kadlec Med. Ctr., 338 P.3d 860, 872–73 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (holding statute that
prohibited an employer from discriminating against “any person” because he or she engaged in protected activity
encompassed claim by independent contractor against employer); cf. Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 332 P.3d
1006, 1011–12 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). An independent contractor may also bring a race discrimination and
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 455 (2008);
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2009). Since Section 1981 only prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race and color, its reach is more limited. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
207 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., West v. Wayne Cnty., 672 F. App’x 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2016) (Family and Medical Leave Act);
Gibbs v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., CIV.A. No. 3:14-cv587-DJH, 2015 WL 4273208, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 14, 2015)
(Federal Railroad Safety Act); Su v. Siemens Indus., Inc., No. 12-cv-03743-JST, 2014 WL 3615582, at *3–4
(N.D. Cal. July 22, 2014) (California Labor Code).
209 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1).
210 West, 672 F. App’x at 539.
211 Id. at 540.
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to fire an employee because he believed that doing so would violate the FMLA;
thus, he had engaged in what would ordinarily qualify as protected opposition
conduct.212 His supervisor then fired him, allegedly for this protected activity.213
But, because the individual was appointed to his position, he did not qualify as
an “eligible employee” under the FMLA’s definition.214 The individual
attempted to place his situation within the holding of Thompson, which extended
a remedy under Title VII to nonemployees.215 But the Sixth Circuit explicitly
rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Thompson, pointing to the fact that the FMLA
does not contain similar aggrieved person language.216 Other courts have also
relied on this same reasoning in rejecting retaliation claims that more closely
resemble the claim at issue in Thompson, where an employer allegedly retaliates
against one employee who has engaged in protected activity by taking action
against another employee.217
3. Statutory Language that Defines Unlawful Employer Action in a Narrow
Manner
Numerous state and federal statutes speak of employer retaliation in terms of
“discharging” an employee or discriminating against an employee in terms of
pay, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.218 These statutes are most
naturally read to limit actionable retaliation to actions impacting an individual’s
job in a material way.219 Indeed, as discussed, the Supreme Court relied heavily
upon the absence of such language, concluding in Burlington Northern that Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision should be construed broadly to prohibit
retaliation that might well dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in
protected activity, even if the retaliation does not impact the terms or conditions
of employment.220

212

Id. at 537.
Id.
214 Id. at 538.
215 Id. at 539.
216
Id.
217 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 3:14-cv-587-DJH, 2015 WL 4273208, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July
14, 2015); Su v. Siemens Indus., Inc., No. 12-cv-03743-JST, 2014 WL 3615582, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 22,
2014).
218 See Long, supra note 8, at 547 (discussing federal statutes employing such language); Alex B. Long,
Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation Claims in a Post-Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77
TENN. L. REV. 253, 272 (2010) (discussing state statutes employing similar language).
219 See Long, supra note 8, at 548 (“[T]he more natural reading of this kind of statutory language would be
to limit retaliation to adverse employment actions or ultimate employment actions.”).
220 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–62 (2006).
213
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On its face, the language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibiting
discrimination and its accompanying material adversity standard appear quite
broad. But the reality is oftentimes quite different. Many courts have adopted a
highly demanding standard as to what qualifies as a materially adverse action. 221
In applying the Supreme Court’s standard from Burlington Northern, these
courts have held as a matter of law that various forms of employer retaliation,
including threatened termination, negative evaluations, disciplinary write-ups,
threatened criminal prosecution, and even the actual filing of a police report,
would not deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity.222
Thus, Title VII’s material adversity standard is often quite demanding in
practice.
The limited nature of Title VII’s anti-retaliation language becomes even
more apparent when one compares it to other statutes that are sometimes
implicated in the cases concerning employer retaliation involving third parties,
as described in this Article. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and
the Fair Housing Act Amendments (“FHAA”) contain language that makes it
unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed” by the respective acts.223 Similar language was
also incorporated into the ADA, which, in addition to language that tracks Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision, makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise” of his or her rights
under the statute.224 The FMLA contains similar language, making it unlawful
for an employer to “interfere” with any individual in the exercise of any rights
provided by the statute, such as the right to medical leave.225 Several state
statutes employ similar language.226
221 See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2033 (2015)
(discussing problems posed by narrow judicial interpretations).
222 See Dick v. Phone Directories Co., Inc., 397 F.3d 1256, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that causing an
employee to file a police report that does not lead to criminal charges does not constitute unlawful retaliation
under Title VII); Sperino, supra note 221, at 2041 (“[C]ourts dismiss cases when workers allege that employers
subjected them to threatened termination; negative evaluations; disciplinary write-ups; threatened suspensions;
disciplinary and administrative leave; shift changes; threatened criminal prosecution; removal from an office;
threatened disciplinary action; and reports of poor performance.”).
223
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); accord 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
224 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that the two provisions are
separate and that different proof structures may apply. See Menoken v. Dhillon, 975 F.3d 1, 9–10 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (concluding that § 12203(b) of the ADA provides distinct protection from the ADA’s anti-retaliation
provision but declining to adopt a specific framework for dealing with such claims).
225 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
226 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-108(b) (2022); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1492.10(B) (2022);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-45(2) (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-26-144(b) (2022); see also ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(10)(D) (2021) (prohibiting a party from “compelling or coercing another” to retaliate against
an individual for engaging in protected activity).
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This type of language may prohibit more forms of employer action than Title
VII’s material adversity standard. On its face, the “coerce, intimidate, threaten,
or interfere” language articulates a broader standard than Burlington Northern’s
material adversity standard.227 For instance, under the plain language of the
provision, a defendant who “threaten[s]” to impose an adverse action—such as
a legal action or demotion—upon an individual who exercised a right guaranteed
by the relevant statute has violated this provision, even if the threat goes
unfulfilled.228 In contrast, numerous courts have held that unfulfilled threats
alone do not meet Title VII’s material adversity standard.229 Courts also have
generally construed the interference clause broadly.230 Some courts have held
that employer coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference is actionable when
it “tends to chill” an employee’s exercise of rights.231 While this language is
similar to the material adversity standard, which prohibits employer conduct that
might dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity,
courts have often given an expansive reading to the “tends to chill” language
that is broader than the reading given in Title VII cases.232
227

Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that ADA provision
prohibiting a defendant from coercing, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with another’s exercise of rights
“arguably sweeps more broadly” than anti-retaliation provision) (quoting 42. U.S.C. § 12203(b)); see Brown v.
City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the ADA’s interference provision “protects a
broader class of persons” than the anti-retaliation provision).
228 See Brown, 336 F.3d at 1193 (“[T]he plain language . . . clearly prohibits a supervisor from threatening
an individual with transfer, demotion, or forced retirement unless the individual foregoes a statutorily protected
accommodation.”); Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that FHAA
plaintiff stated a claim where landlord threatened to evict plaintiff for complaining that tenants were engaging
in disability harassment); Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 222–24 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding employer’s threat to initiate legal action if plaintiff continued to request a reasonable accommodation
amounted to unlawful threats or intimidation).
229 See Sperino, supra note 221, at 2041 (“[C]ourts dismiss cases when workers allege that employers
subjected them to threatened termination; negative evaluations; disciplinary write-ups; threatened suspensions;
disciplinary and administrative leave; shift changes; threatened criminal prosecution; removal from an office;
threatened disciplinary action; and reports of poor performance.”).
230 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001) (“‘[I]nterference,’ in
particular, ‘has been broadly applied to reach all practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise
of rights under the federal fair housing laws.’” (quoting United States v. Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir.
1994))); Mich. Prot. & Advoc. Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating the FHAA’s
language has been interpreted broadly).
231 See Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 629 F. App’x 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (“A rule violates [the NLRA’s
interference provision] if it would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their [rights].”);
Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defendant violated FMLA by
engaging in conduct that tends to chill an employee’s freedom to exercise employee’s rights); see also N.Y.
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1998) (“An employer’s conduct violates [the NLRA’s
interference provision] if under all the existing circumstances, the conduct has a reasonable tendency to coerce
or intimidate employees, regardless of whether they are actually coerced.”).
232 See, e.g., Cal. Acrylic Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that filming and photographing of employees engaged in union activities violates the NLRA); F.W. Woolworth
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While this type of provision most naturally applies when an employer takes
action against an individual who has asserted a substantive right under the
applicable statute,233 some courts have held that this language covers an
individual’s right to oppose unlawful conduct and the more general right to work
in a workplace free from discrimination.234 Consistent with decisional law under
the NLRA, at least one court has held that this provision applies where, as in
Thompson, an employer takes action against an employee who has filed a
discrimination claim against the employer by taking action against a relative of
the complaining employee, including even where the relative is a
nonemployee.235
In a case from Maine, an employee was fired after complaining about
unlawful conduct on the part of employees of a different employer at the same
jobsite.236 According to the plaintiff, this other employer had hired the plaintiff’s
employer to perform work at the site and threatened to fire the plaintiff’s
employer unless it fired the plaintiff for having made the complaints. 237 The
court concluded that the other employer had unlawfully coerced or compelled
the plaintiff’s employer to fire the plaintiff in retaliation for having engaged in
protected activity.238 The fact that this type of language potentially provides
some plaintiffs with a remedy when the majority approach under Title VII does
not highlights the comparatively limited nature of Title VII’s retaliation
provision.

Co., 310 NLRB 204, 2014 (1993) (finding that taking pictures of employees without justification has a tendency
to chill employees in the exercise of their rights under the NLRA). At least one court has adopted Title VII’s
material adversity standard for use in cases brought pursuant to this “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere”
language in other statutes. See Marks v. BLDG Mgmt. Co., No. 99 CIV. 5733, 2002 WL 764473, at *9–11
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2002) (adopting this standard).
233 See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124 (holding that FMLA’s “interference” language, not its anti-retaliation
language, applies when employer takes negative action against employees who used FMLA leave).
234 See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570–71 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing claim where
employer allegedly took action against father who filed a discrimination claim under the ADA against employer
by firing son); Lopez v. Commonwealth, 978 N.E.2d 67, 78 (Mass. 2012) (“Among the rights protected by
[Massachusetts’s employment relation statute] is the right to be free from discrimination in the terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment, which includes the right to equal opportunities for promotion without
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.”).
235 See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570–71 (recognizing ADA claim by son who was allegedly fired because of
his father’s opposition to discrimination by the same employer); Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907
F.2d 400, 407 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing such a claim under the NLRA where employer fired a supervisor who
was not a covered employee under the Act).
236 Me. Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. Saddleback, Inc., No. CV-06-219, 2008 WL 6875449, at *1–2 (Me. Super.
Ct. Oct. 31, 2008).
237 Id. at *4–5.
238 Id. at *8.
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C. The Failure to Reflect the Realities of the Modern Workplace
Another problem with existing workplace retaliation law that the third-party
retaliation cases discussed in this Article highlight is the failure of the law to
reflect the realities of the modern workplace. The employment law field as a
whole is wrestling with the increasing prevalence of independent contractors and
other nonemployees in the workplace. While the traditional workplace was
likely to consist almost exclusively of an employer and its employees, the
modern workplace increasingly consists of employees, independent contractors,
and workers provided by staffing agencies.239 This increase in the number of
“fissured” workplaces in which multiple employers may have influence over an
employee’s work environment raises challenging questions concerning the
scope of an employer’s liability for the misconduct of nonemployee workers.240
1. The Problem of Multiple Employers and the Presence of Third Parties in
the Workplace
Title VII protects employees from discrimination and retaliation by their
employers. The statute does not extend protection to independent contractors. 241
But employers’ increasing reliance on independent contractors and other
nonemployee workers has spurred controversy concerning the ability of
employers to avoid liability for harassment and other forms of discrimination
targeted at contractors and other nonemployee workers.242
The issues are made even more difficult by the reality of today’s workplace
that more than one employer may have influence over an employee’s work
environment. To establish liability for discrimination or retaliation against an
entity that is not technically the employee’s employer, but that exerts
considerable influence or control over the employee’s job performance, the
employee would need to rely on a joint employer theory. A joint employer
239 See Ruben Alan Garcia, Modern Accountability for a Modern Workplace: Reevaluating the National
Labor Relations Board’s Joint Employer Standard, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 749 (2016) (stating that the
modern workplace is “a ‘fissured’ collection of franchises, subcontractors, and staffing agencies”).
240
See Charlotte Garden and Joseph E. Slater, Comments on the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law,
Chapter 1, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 265, 266 (2017) (“‘Fissured’ work arrangements in which multiple
entities are responsible for different aspects of employees’ working conditions are becoming increasingly
common.”).
241 See Proa v. NRT Mid Atl., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 447, 458 (D. Md. 2009) (“Title VII does not apply to
independent contractors.”).
242 See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-FirstCentury Work: The “Independent Worker” 7 (Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2015-10, 2015),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_kruege
r_harris.pdf.
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relationship may exist when two separate employers are “not sufficiently related
to qualify as an integrated enterprise, but . . . exercise sufficient control of an
individual to qualify” as the individual’s employer.243
There are numerous Title VII discrimination and retaliation cases involving
plaintiffs who are technically employed by one employer but who interact with
another entity, and in which the issue of joint employer status is at issue. 244
Courts have recognized that two entities can be considered the same employer
of an employee in the Title VII context when they “share or co-determine those
matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” 245 But,
unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement among the federal courts
concerning the appropriate test for making this determination.246 Regardless of
243

Section 2 Threshold Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, at III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-2-threshold-issues.
244 See, e.g., Tillman v. Hammond’s Transp., LLC, No. 20-1656, 2021 WL 1733995, at *1 (E.D. La. May
3, 2021); Smith v. SpiriTrust Lutheran, No. 1:20-cv-00174, 2021 WL 1103571, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2021).
245 Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
246 Courts have adopted three different tests to determine joint employer status under Title VII. Courts
applying the control test tend to apply the following factors:
1) authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions
of employment, including compensation, benefits, and hours;
2) day-to-day supervision of employees, including employee discipline; and
3) control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.
Butterbaugh v. Chertoff, 479 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Cella v. Villanova Univ., No. 01–
7181, 2003 WL 329147, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003)). This test gives considerable weight to whether the
second employer maintains control over the formalities of the working relationship, such as whether the second
employer has the authority to promulgate work rules and assignments; set compensation, benefits, and hours;
and maintain control over employee records, such as payroll and taxes. See Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984); see also 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2021) (employing similar rule under the FLSA). “[The
economic realities test] differs from the control test in that it focuses on ‘degree of economic dependence of
alleged employees on the business with which they are connected that indicates employee status.’” Butler, 793
F.3d at 411–12. (quoting EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983)). As the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has explained, “the economic realities test focuses less on the legal parameters of employment, but
more on the entity (or entities) on which the employee relies on for work and remuneration—irrespective of who
is actually writing the paychecks and determining work status.” Id. at 412. Finally, some courts have adopted a
hybrid test, which focuses on a host of factors:
(1) authority to hire and fire the individual;
(2) day-to-day supervision of the individual, including employee discipline;
(3) whether the putative employer furnishes the equipment used and the place of work;
(4) possession of and responsibility over the individual’s employment records, including payroll, insurance,
and taxes;
(5) the length of time during which the individual has worked for the putative employer;
(6) whether the putative employer provides the individual with formal or informal training;
(7) whether the individual’s duties are akin to a regular employee’s duties;
(8) whether the individual is assigned solely to the putative employer; and
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the test a court employs, the law in this area lacks a touchstone or unifying theme
to help guide courts.247 The result is a considerable amount of unpredictability
on the issue of whether a court will classify a particular entity as a joint
employer.248
2. The Likelihood for More Retaliation Involving Third Parties
As Professor Dallan Flake has argued, “[e]mployees are more vulnerable to
discrimination by non-employees than ever before. This is due to the fact that in
the modern workplace[,] employees are more likely to interact regularly with
non-employees, thus heightening the possibility of discrimination.”249 By the
same logic, employees are more vulnerable to retaliation for complaining about
discrimination than ever before.
Flake identifies two main reasons why employees are more likely to interact
with nonemployees in today’s workplace.250 The first is the fact that that the U.S.
economy has become service-based, thus creating more opportunities for
employees to interact with customers and clients.251 Second, modern workplaces
“often house more than just a single organization’s workers; vendors, suppliers,
temporary employees, employees of other entities, independent contractors, and
many others are also regularly present.”252 The increasing complexity of the
modern workplace also makes it more difficult to identify which employer
employs an employee in given cases. When one also takes into account “the
proliferation of professional employer organizations, employee management
companies, temporary employment and staffing agencies, joint-employment
agreements, and work-sharing arrangements,” the issue of who qualifies as an
“employee” in a given case becomes increasingly complex.253
While the increased interaction between employees and nonemployees
creates more potential for discrimination by nonemployees, it also necessarily
means more potential for employer retaliation involving third parties. For
(9) whether the individual and putative employer intended to enter into an employment relationship.
Id. at 414.
247
See Kati L. Griffith, The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old is New Again, 104 CORNELL
L. REV. 557, 599 (2010) (“Administrators and courts struggle to identify a touchstone in these cases that would
lead to more consistency and predictability.”).
248 See id. at 563–65 (noting the lack of predictability on this issue).
249 Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Nonemployee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1169, 1176
(2017).
250 Id
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1180.
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example, the fact that many workplaces now regularly contain a mix of
employees and nonemployees makes it more likely that an individual will
complain to someone—either the individual’s own employer or the employer
who actually controls the workplace—about the harassment by someone—either
an employee or a nonemployee—against someone else—either an employee or
a nonemployee. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that an employer will take
action in response against someone—either the employer’s own employee or a
third party.
3. The Failure of the Law to Address the Realities of the Modern Workforce
as Applied to Workplace Retaliation
If the realities of the modern workplace increase the likelihood of retaliation
involving third parties, the reality is also that the law as it currently exists is
unlikely to afford a remedy to the victims. The narrow language contained in
some anti-retaliation provisions, the cramped judicial interpretation of some of
that language, and the increased interaction between employees and
nonemployees in the workplace necessarily means that more individuals
involved in these types of retaliation cases involving third parties will be without
an effective remedy.
In some cases, resorting to the joint employer rules may enable an individual
to proceed on a retaliation claim against an entity that is not technically the
individual’s employer.254 But, by and large, these rules have only limited
application to the situations described in this Article. In some cases in which an
employee reports a coworker’s harassment of a nonemployee, there may be no
argument at all that the nonemployee is an “employee” at all, such as where the
nonemployee is a customer.255 As such, the joint employer rule would not aid
the reporting employee, and the employee would be at the mercy of whether a
court concludes that the employee could reasonably believe that it is unlawful
for a coworker to harass a nonemployee.
The joint employer theory is even less likely to apply in the second category
of cases in which an employer takes action against a nonemployee in retaliation
for the protected conduct of an employee. In many of these cases, the friend or
family member who is targeted by the employer to pay for the “sins” of the

254 See, e.g., Peterkin v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 21-490, 2021 WL 2400753, at *9–10 (E.D. Pa.
June 11, 2021) (concluding plaintiff plausibly alleged entities were joint employers for purposes of Title VII
claim).
255 See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
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employee will not even work in the employer’s workplace.256 As a result, there
is likely to be little argument that the third party is an employee of the employer.
D. The Failure of Courts to Treat Retaliation and Discrimination as Being
Connected
A final shortcoming of retaliation law that is illustrated by the types of cases
discussed in this Article is the tendency of some courts to treat the problems of
retaliation and discrimination as being unrelated in purpose. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly stressed the role that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision plays
in furthering the statute’s overarching goal of eliminating discrimination.257 Yet,
courts that take a narrow view of the anti-retaliation provision tend to consider
retaliation claims in isolation, making only infrequent reference to the role that
employer retaliation plays in furthering discrimination.
For example, decisions holding that no claim exists when an employer
retaliates against an employee by targeting a nonemployee are often premised
on the view that the only interests covered by Title VII are the interests of those
in employment relationships with the defendant.258 The plaintiff’s interests, as a
nonemployee, are, “at best, only ‘marginally related to’ the purposes of Title
VII.”259 This represents a disturbingly narrow vision of the purposes of Title VII.
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision exists to further the statute’s antidiscrimination goal. By taking the position that one of the victims of an
employer’s retaliation is only marginally related to the goals of the statute is to
treat the question of whether one qualifies as an aggrieved person as some sort
of sterile, intellectual inquiry divorced from the purposes of the statute.
The same is true of the decisions holding that no unlawful retaliation has
occurred when an employer takes action against an employee for reporting a
coworker’s harassment of a nonemployee or for complaining about
discrimination that is unlawful under some other statute but not Title VII. These
decisions proceed from the underlying assumption that such conduct is so far
removed from the scope of Title VII that the reporting employee could not even
reasonably believe that such conduct was unlawful under Title VII. 260 This
mindset is particularly jarring in light of the law’s treatment of claims involving

256
257
258
259

See supra notes 124–139 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34–35, 45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text.
Simmons v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 972 F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1382

(2021).
260

See supra notes 73–94 and accompanying text.
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harassment by a third party to the employment relationship, such as a customer.
In such cases, not only can an employer be held liable for permitting such
harassment, but the employer can also be held liable for retaliating against the
employee who complains about such harassment.261
Retaliation cases involving third parties are but one example of the narrow
view of the purpose of anti-retaliation provisions that some courts take. For
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern explicitly noted
that a broad standard for determining when retaliation is actionable was
consistent with Title VII’s anti-discrimination purpose.262 The standard the
Court adopted—whether the action was materially adverse (i.e., whether the
action might deter a reasonable employee from complaining about
discrimination)—directly ties Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to its antidiscrimination goal. Yet, numerous courts have interpreted the Court’s standard
in a highly restrictive manner.263 In general, the decisions that take this
restrictive approach tend to be more likely to omit any specific reference to the
issue of whether the action would be likely to deter a reasonable employee from
complaining about discrimination than are the decisions that apply the Court’s
material adversity standard in a manner consistent with the Court’s decision.264
In short, courts that recognize the connection between the two provisions are
more likely to apply the Court’s material adversity standard in a manner
consistent with the Court’s decision.
This tendency to view the purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision in
a limited manner keeps with the approach of some courts that treat Title VII as
a statutory tort—the primary goal of which is to provide a remedy to an

261 See, e.g., Riggs v. DXP Enters., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00729, 2019 WL 5682897, at *4 (W.D. La. Oct. 31,
2019) (recognizing that an employee who files an EEOC charge about such conduct has engaged in protected
activity); Thompson v. Panos X Foods, Inc., No. 14-10620, 2016 WL 1615702, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2016)
(recognizing that complaining internally about such conduct is protected activity).
262 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
263 See Sperino, supra note 221, at 2035.
264
Compare Emami v. Bolden, 241 F. Supp. 3d 673, 685 (E.D. Va. 2017) (stating that a negative
performance review, standing alone, does not constitute a materially adverse action but failing to mention
possible deterrent effect of such conduct), and Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2011)
(concluding that employer who issued written warnings to employee in response to complaint of discrimination
had not engaged in materially adverse action but failing to mention possible deterrent effect of such conduct),
with Mazur v. Sw. Veterans Ctr., No. CV17-826, 2018 WL 3957410, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2018)
(referencing possible deterrent effect of supervisor’s berating of plaintiff in front of other employees in denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss), and Hallmon v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (D. Colo.
2013) (referencing possible deterrent effect that repeated threats to issue a written warning, even if not acted
upon, might have in concluding that such conduct may qualify as materially adverse).
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individual plaintiff.265 Increasingly lost is the notion that Title VII’s mission is
to end discrimination in the workplace.266 As courts take a narrower view of the
statute’s purposes, they tend also to see Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision as
having only limited connection to the statute’s broad anti-discrimination goals.
All too often, the result is a narrow interpretation or application of Title VII’s
language in the retaliation context.
V. SOLUTIONS
Courts need to approach all retaliation cases with the idea that robust
protection from retaliation is essential to fulfilling Title VII’s anti-discrimination
purpose. Regardless of whether a retaliation case involves a third party to the
employer-employee relationship, courts should remain mindful of how
employment retaliation may ultimately impact third parties if Title VII and other
statutory anti-retaliation provisions are to serve their purposes. The following
Part elaborates upon these ideas and applies them to the scenarios involving third
parties in order to illustrate how courts and legislatures might put them into
effect.
A. Interpreting Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision to Take into Account the
Third-Party Effects of Discrimination
As the notion that Title VII is effectively a statutory tort has taken hold
among courts, courts have increasingly viewed the primary purpose of the statute
as to provide a remedy to an individual victim of discrimination.267 Under this
compensation-based conception of the statute, courts view disputes under Title
VII as being limited to the parties involved. But it is important to recognize that
the original goal of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in the workplace

265

See Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law,
75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1316 (2014) (“Title VII has been reshaped [by courts] from an enterprise liabililty scheme
to a ‘statutory tort,’ capable of redressing a limited number of wrongs done to individual employees, but largely
incapable of achieving Title VII’s broad purpose of deterring and eradicating workplace discrimination.”).
266
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination
Litigation and its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2003) (“There is no longer any concerted effort to
eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing monetary compensation for past
discrimination without particular concern for preventing future discrimination, or even remedying past
discrimination, through injunctive relief.”).
267 See William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let Employment
Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 462 (2013) (noting that the view of employment
discrimination laws as “essentially federal statutory torts, the primary purpose of which is to compensate
individuals for the personal injuries they suffer as a result of discrimination” has become the primary perception
of the laws among courts).
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in general.268 When considering the problems of employment discrimination
and retaliation, it is helpful to keep in mind the costs that permitting such
conduct imposes on third parties and society more generally.
As others have noted, one of the most effective ways of preventing
workplace harassment and discrimination is to provide robust protection from
retaliation.269 The ability of Title VII to combat workplace harassment and
discrimination depends in no small measure on the willingness of employees to
speak out about such behavior. Whether it is an employee who reports such
conduct internally through an employer’s established complaint process or an
employee who files an EEOC charge or otherwise participates in a formal
proceeding involving workplace discrimination, employees play a vital role in
bringing discrimination to light.
The harms borne by the victims of employment discrimination—both
economic and emotional—are well-documented.270 And, obviously, the victims
of employment retaliation—whether employees of the employer or third
parties—experience their own harms. But when considering the harms that
employment discrimination and retaliation cause, it is worth noting that the
harms are not necessarily restricted to the immediate victims.
For example, employment discrimination causes economic harm beyond that
experienced by direct victims. According to a 2020 study by Citigroup, the U.S.
economy lost $2.7 trillion in income due to disparity in wages suffered by
African Americans.271 Other studies report significant losses in gross domestic
product due to employment discrimination against older workers, LGBTQ
employees, and the victims of sexual harassment.272
268 See id. at 456–57 (stating that, as originally conceived, “Title VII was primarily a public policy and civil
rights statute aimed at eradicating” employment discrimination).
269 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
49, 50 (2018) (“[E]nding harassment must start with preventing retaliation.”).
270 See Press Release, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, Report: The Long-term Toll of Sexual Harassment:
Research Shows that Women’s Health, Job Security and Earnings are Impacted (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.aauw.org/resources/news/media/press-releases/report-explores-the-long-term-toll-of-sexualharassment/ (stating that sexual harassment is a factor in the pay gap between men and women and reporting
that 27% of women who were harassed reported that the harassment disrupted their career advancement).
271 See Adedayo Akala, Cost of Racism: U.S. Economy Lost $16 Trillion Because of Discrimination, Bank
Says,
NPR
(Sept.
23,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racialjustice/2020/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-discrimination-banksays.
272 See Kenneth Terrell, Age Discrimination Costs the Nation $850 Billion, Study Finds, AARP (Jan. 30,
2020),
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2020/age-discrimination-economic-impact.html
(reporting results of study authored by the American Association for Retired Persons and the Economist
Intelligence Unit); Crosby Burns, The Costly Business of Discrimination, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 20, 2012),
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One of the clearest examples of how the costs of employment discrimination
may be borne by third parties is the case of disability discrimination. When the
ADA was first introduced in Congress, supporters touted the economic benefits
of the Act.273 According to supporters, outright exclusion from the workplace of
individuals with disabilities and the failure of employers to make reasonable
accommodations to the disabilities of employees and applicants cost U.S.
taxpayers billions of dollars annually in terms of unemployment and
underemployment of individuals with disabilities.274 Statistics showed that twothirds of individuals with disabilities between the ages of sixteen and sixty-four
wanted to work, but were unable to find work.275 By requiring employers to
make modest adjustments to their workplaces or the manner in which work is
performed, supporters of the ADA argued that the Act would help reduce
unemployment among people with disabilities.276 Thus, in addition to the moral
case for a law prohibiting discrimination against qualified individuals with
disabilities, supporters of the ADA explicitly advanced an economic argument
that noted the benefits to society as a whole.
An employer that retaliates against one who opposes discrimination
occurring in the workplace contributes to these kinds of third-party harms. For
example, the employer that is in a position to address harassment occurring in
connection with the employer’s business—regardless of whether the perpetrator
or victim is an employee—who instead retaliates against one who brings such
harassment to the employer’s attention contributes to a workplace culture that
allows discrimination and harassment to flourish. In such a case, the employer
is contributing to the direct costs of discrimination and retaliation suffered by
the victims as well as the costs to future victims and society more generally.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtq-rights/reports/2012/03/22/11234/the-costly-business-ofdiscrimination/ (stating that the annual estimated cost of losing and replacing more than 2 million American
workers who leave their jobs each year due to unfairness and discrimination is $64 billion and that 42% of gay
workers report having experienced workplace discrimination); DELOITTE, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
IN
THE
WORKPLACE:
FINAL
REPORT
5
(Mar.
2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/Documents/Economics/deloitte-au-economic-costs-sexualharassment-workplace-240320.pdf (estimating costs of $3.5 billion in lost productivity and other costs due to
sexual harassment in Australia).
273
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 921, 926–27 (2003) (“[S]upporters of the proposed ADA argued that the statute was necessary to reduce
the high societal cost of dependency—that people with disabilities were drawing public assistance instead of
working, and that a regime of ‘reasonable accommodations’ could move people with disabilities off of the public
assistance rolls and into the workforce in a way that would ultimately save the nation money.”).
274 See id. at 966–67 (citing legislative history).
275 See BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., PETER J. MCGOVERN & JON S. SHULTZ, DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PUBLIC LAW 101-336,
at 9 (1992).
276 See Bagenstos, supra note 273, at 969–70 (citing legislative history).
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B. Interpreting Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision to Advance the Statute’s
Anti-Discrimination Purpose
Courts that interpret Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes in a
manner that permits retaliation to thrive—regardless of whether the direct effects
of the retaliation are borne solely by an employee or whether they extend to
nonemployees like friends and family—also contribute to the problem of
discrimination in the workplace. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
the important role that anti-retaliation provisions play in the fight against
discrimination. Lower courts need to do a better job of giving effect to this
guidance.
1. Retaliation Against an Employee for Opposing Discrimination Against a
Nonemployee: Revisiting the Reasonable Belief Standard
A court that keeps the interconnected nature of Title VII’s anti-retaliation
and anti-discrimination goals in mind is more likely to give a broad reading to
the relevant legal concepts in a retaliation case. One example is the decisional
law requiring an employee to have a reasonable belief that the conduct being
opposed was unlawful before the employee is entitled to protection under the
statute. As discussed, some courts, while paying lip service to the notion of a
“reasonable belief” standard, in reality apply a much more demanding
standard.277 The effect is often to limit the scope of Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision, including in the situations described in this Article. A court that views
robust protection from retaliation as a crucial means of advancing the statute’s
anti-discrimination purpose is more likely to give a broad—or at least a good
faith—reading of this requirement.
Several authors have suggested doing away altogether with the reasonable
belief standard.278 Under this approach, opposition conduct would be protected
provided an employee has a good faith belief that the conduct opposed was
unlawful.279 Indeed, numerous state whistleblower and discrimination statutes
employ such a good faith standard.280 There is much to recommend in adopting
a subjective, good faith standard, but given the fact that every federal circuit
employs the reasonable belief standard, it is perhaps too much to expect courts
to completely jettison the objective standard.
277

See supra notes 163–171 and accompanying text.
See Rosenthal, supra note 164, at 1149; Gorod, supra note 169, at 1502.
279 See Rosenthal, supra note 164, at 1149.
280 See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. ANN. § 1423(a) (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:967 (2020); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833 (2020).
278
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Instead, courts could maintain the objective standard but alter its focus to
better comport with existing law. Ordinarily, when the law adopts a generic
reasonableness standard, it does so on the assumption that the person required
to meet that standard has the requisite knowledge or experience to make an
objectively reasonable determination as to a course of action. For example, tort
law generally assumes that every adult individual has the requisite life
experience to make a determination as to how to proceed when driving a car,
handling hot beverages, or confronting slippery floors. These are all situations
in which the average individual has the knowledge or life experience to make an
objectively reasonable decision as to how to proceed.
In assessing whether the individual acted reasonably when engaging in such
activities, tort law adopts a generic “reasonable person” standard. In other words,
did the individual exercise the care that a reasonable person would exercise
under the circumstance?281 When the individual has some relevant special
knowledge, skill, or training, tort law often takes that characteristic into account
in assessing reasonableness.282 Thus, a lawyer must act as a reasonable lawyer
under the same circumstances, not a reasonable person.283 A professional driver
must act as a reasonable professional driver under the same circumstances, a
teacher must act as a reasonable teacher, a farmer must act as a reasonable
farmer, and so on.284 In each instance, the individual’s conduct is measured
against that of the hypothetical individual in the same class, and the individual
is presumed to have the same general knowledge as others within that class. 285
In other instances, tort law recognizes that an individual may lack the sort of
specialized knowledge that another may have. Thus, in a medical case, a court
may inquire as to what a reasonable patient or a reasonable client would have
understood about a medical procedure.286 In a legal malpractice action, a court
may inquire as to what a reasonable client would have understood about a legal
281

See, e.g., Bailey v. Lenord, 625 P.2d 849, 856 (Alaska 1981) (recognizing the standard of care as that
which a reasonable person would observe).
282 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“If an actor has skills or knowledge that
exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in
determining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful person.”).
283 See, e.g., Stewart v. Elliott, 239 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 2010) (referencing the standard of care as being
that of a reasonable attorney).
284 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010) (discussing the standard to which
a professional driver is held, as well as professionals in general); see also Dakter v. Cavallino, 866 N.W.2d 656,
668–69 (Wis. 2015) (discussing the standard to which a professional truck driver is held).
285 See, e.g., Grams v. Milk Prod., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005) (“A reasonable farmer would
know that switching to an unmedicated milk replacer could cause some increase in calf mortality.”).
286 See Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331, 343 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (“Ohio recognizes the informed consent
doctrine in medical malpractice cases and applies an objective (or reasonable patient) standard . . . .”).
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question.287 In the case of children, who typically cannot be expected to meet
the same standard as that of a reasonable adult, the relevant standard of care is
that of a reasonable minor of the same age, intelligence, and experience.288
Logically, if one is going to adopt a reasonableness standard when assessing
an employee’s conduct, one would ask whether the individual acted as a
reasonable employee under the circumstances. Indeed, this is the language courts
use in other Title VII contexts. For example, when assessing whether retaliation
is actionable, courts routinely ask whether the employer’s conduct would
dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. 289 This
standard takes into account the fact that the relevant actor in this case is, in fact,
an employee, with whatever special characteristics and concerns attendant to
that category of individuals. When assessing whether an employer has
constructively discharged an employee, courts typically consider whether a
reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign.290 In short, Title VII
decisional law in other contexts often focuses on what the reasonable employee
would do or think in a given situation.
In contrast, when considering whether an employee’s opposition conduct is
protected, courts do not usually speak in terms of what a reasonable employee
would believe or have done. Instead, they typically speak of whether the
employee has a reasonable belief or reasonably believed the conduct to be
unlawful without any reference to the reasonable employee.291 The distinction is
subtle but potentially significant. The current approach of courts puts the

287 See Frederick v. Wallerich, 907 N.W.2d 167, 177 (Minn. 2018) (assessing what a reasonable client
would have expected); Nguyen v. Ford, 49 Cal. App. 5th 1, 15–16 (2020) (inquiring as to what an objectively
reasonable client would have understood); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 19, cmt. c (2000) (“[A]ny contract limiting the representation is construed from the standpoint of a reasonable
client.”).
288 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“If the actor is a child, the standard
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age,
intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”).
289 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
290 See Kegerise v. Delgrande, 183 A.3d 997, 1001 (Pa. 2018).
291
While some federal courts of appeals add the requirement that an employee must have a “good faith”
reasonable belief, every federal appellate court employs this “reasonable belief” standard. See Heisler v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 931 F.3d 786, 798 (8th Cir. 2019); Owens v. Old Wis. Sausage Co., 870 F.3d 662,
668 (7th Cir. 2017); Cooper v. N.Y. State Dep’t Lab., 819 F.3d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 2016); Hansen v. Skywest
Airlines, 844 F.3d 914, 926 (10th Cir. 2016); Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1312 (11th Cir.
2016); Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Tech., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 646 (6th Cir. 2015); Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd.
of Governors, Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193–
94 (3d Cir. 2015); Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 48 (2010); Savage v. Maryland, 896
F.3d 260, 276 (4th Cir. 2018); Allen v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008); Freitag v. Ayers,
468 F.3d 528, 541 (9th Cir. 2006).
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emphasis on the reasonableness of the belief, thus prompting courts to look to
existing law to help determine whether the plaintiff’s belief was reasonable; the
reasonableness of the employee’s belief is measured against existing law.292 The
employee’s lack of knowledge of Title VII is no excuse (despite the fact that few
employees have reason to know the details of Title VII).293
In contrast, a reasonable employee standard puts the primary focus on the
employee. In other words, the employee’s belief is measured against the belief
of other employees. In assessing the reasonableness of an individual’s actions or
beliefs, tort law teaches that a reasonable person is only expected to have the
knowledge that an average person possesses on the subject.294 There is relatively
little empirical evidence concerning employees’ knowledge of Title VII, but
what little evidence there is suggests that employees know little about
employment law in general and tend to overestimate the limits that it places on
employers’ actions.295
Any reasonable judge would assume that most employees have little
substantive knowledge of employment discrimination law. Therefore, a standard
that measures an employee’s knowledge against that of the hypothetical
reasonable employee is more likely to result in a finding that the employee
engaged in protected activity. More importantly, such a standard better enables
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to further Title VII’s anti-discrimination
goals.
Ultimately, the focus of a court should be on whether the conduct in question
would lead a reasonable employee to oppose the conduct. This would necessarily
require an assessment from the perspective of a reasonable employee in the same
circumstances. The important question should ultimately be whether a
reasonable employee could have believed that Title VII prohibited the conduct
in question. Consistent with tort law’s reasonable person standard, the fact that
a particular employee has special experience, education, or training when it
comes to Title VII would be relevant to the determination.
292

See Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).
See Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002).
294 See State v. Manjares, No. 36846-7-III, 2020 WL 5437740, at *4 (Sept. 10, 2020) (“[W]e require a
reasonable person to know matters ‘in so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the
community.’” (citations omitted)); Richardson v. Floyd, No. S-4048, 1991 WL 11657762, at *3 (Alaska Sept.
5, 1991) (discussing the reasonableness of an individual’s belief in terms of what a reasonable person, with the
average person’s knowledge, would have believed).
295 See Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of
Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307,
317–38 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 105–06 (1997).
293
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A court that applied these principles to the kinds of scenarios discussed in
this Article would almost certainly conclude that the conduct of the plaintiff is
protected. For the reasons discussed, a reasonable employee could certainly
believe that it is unlawful for a coworker to harass a nonemployee while in the
performance of the employee’s job duties. Likewise, an employee who observes
job-related discrimination might reasonably believe that such discrimination is
unlawful under Title VII, even if it is actually only unlawful under a different
statute. Accordingly, such opposition conduct should be protected under Title
VII.
2. Employer Retaliation Targeting Nonemployee Third Parties:
Recognizing Third-Party Harms
A court that views providing robust protection from retaliation as a means of
furthering Title VII’s anti-discrimination mandate is also more likely to arrive
at the conclusion that a third party who is harmed by an employer’s retaliatory
acts is an aggrieved person who is entitled to a remedy. As discussed,
Thompson’s “zone of interests” test for determining aggrieved person status is
not meant to be particularly demanding and should cover an individual who has
interests arguably sought to be protected by the statute.296 To paraphrase
Thompson, hurting a nonemployee is the unlawful act by which the employer
punishes an employee who has engaged in protected conduct related to Title
VII’s anti-discrimination mission.297 By taking action against the nonemployee
victim, the employer sends a message to other employees to think twice before
complaining about unlawful discrimination. Providing a remedy in this case
quite clearly furthers the interest in eliminating discrimination. Therefore, courts
need to approach this issue with the broader purpose of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision in mind.
CONCLUSION
There are numerous shortcomings that prevent statutory anti-retaliation
provisions from reaching their full potential in the typical kinds of retaliation
cases. These include inconsistent and sometimes restrictive statutory language,
restrictive judicial interpretations of that language, and a tendency on the part of
courts to treat retaliation cases as having little connection to the goals of antidiscrimination law. All too often, the result is that employer retaliation goes
unchecked. In addition to the harm to the immediate victims of retaliation, the
296
297

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011).
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failure of statutory anti-retaliation provisions to reach their full potential results
in harm to third parties more generally, including subsequent victims who have
been deterred from reporting workplace discrimination and society in the form
of the undermining of the purposes of anti-retaliation law.
Changes to the conception of the modern workplace present new challenges
for employment discrimination law. As this Article illustrates, one of those
challenges is how to deal with nontraditional forms of employment retaliation.
The shortcomings that prevent employment retaliation law from reaching its full
potential are only magnified in situations in which a nonemployee is either the
victim of discrimination or retaliation. In order to fulfill the fundamental
purposes of statutory anti-retaliation provisions, courts should interpret Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision to take into account the third-party effects of
discrimination and in a manner that advances the statute’s anti-discrimination
purpose.

